We present a new approach to edit distance attacks on certain clockcontrolled generators, which applies basic concepts of Graph Theory to simplify the search trees of the original attacks in such a way that only the most promising branches are analyzed. In particular, the proposed improvement is based on cut sets defined on some graphs so that certain shortest paths provide the edit distances. The strongest aspects of the proposal are that the obtained results from the attack are absolutely deterministic, and that many inconsistent initial states of the target registers are recognized beforehand and avoided during search.
Introduction
The primary goal in the design of stream ciphers is to generate long pseudorandom keystream sequences from a short key in such a way that it is not possible to reconstruct the short key from the keystream sequence. This work focuses on stream ciphers based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LF SRs), and more particularly on Shrinking [1] and Alternating Step [2] generators. Both generators produce keystream sequences with high linear complexity, long period and good statistical properties [3] , and have been thoroughly analyzed in several papers such as [4] and [5] .
Most types of cryptanalysis on stream ciphers are performed under a known plaintext hypothesis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct access to the keystream output from the generator [6] . The computational complexity of such attacks is always compared with the complexity of the exhaustive search, and if the former is smaller, then the cipher is said to be broken. Although this theoretical definition can look useless, in fact it is very important for the development and understanding of the security of stream ciphers because many times it reveals weaknesses that might lead to practical attacks.
The main idea behind this paper is to propose an optimisation approach that leads to a deterministic and exponential improvement of the complexity of a known plaintext divide-and-conquer attack consisting of three steps:
1.-Guess the initial state of an LF SR component of the generator.
2.-Try to determine the other variables of the cipher based on the intercepted keystream.
3.
-Check that guess was consistent with observed keystream sequence. This three-step attack was first proposed in [7] and [8] by means of a theoretical model and a distance function known as Levenshtein or edit distance. Furthermore, [9] proved that when the length of the intercepted sequence is large enough, the number of candidate initial states in such an attack is small.
The approach considered in this work may be seen as an extension of the constrained edit distance attack to clock-controlled LF SR-based generators presented in [10] and generalized in [11] . Our main aim here is to investigate whether the number of initial states to be analyzed can be reduced. This feature was pointed out in [12] as one of the most interesting problems in the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. According to the original method, the attacker needs to traverse an entire search tree including all the possible LF SR initial states. However, in this work the original attack is improved by simplifying the search tree in such a way that only the most efficient branches are retained. In order to achieve such a goal, cut sets are defined in certain graphs that are here used to model the original attack. This new approach produces a significant improvement in the computing time of the original edit distance attack since it implies a dramatic reduction in the number of initial states that need to be evaluated. This quantitative improvement is well established through implementation for the specific cases of Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators. Furthermore, it is remarkable that, unlike previous attacks, the results obtained with the proposal of his work are fully deterministic.
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic definitions of Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators and essential concepts regarding edit distances. In Section 3, some ideas for an efficient initial state selection method are given that allow describing a method for deducing a threshold value for the computation of the edit distance. Section 4 presents the full description of the proposed attack. Finally, Section 5 contains specific details for the cases of Shrinking and Alternating Generators and Section 6 provides several conclusions.
Preliminaries
The Shrinking Generator (SG) is a nonlinear combinator based on two LF SRs, introduced in 1993 by Coppersmith, Krawczyk and Mansour [1] . In this generator the bits produced by one LF SR, denoted by S, are used to determine whether the corresponding bits generated by the second LF SR, denoted by A, are used as part of the overall keystream or not.
The Alternating
Step Generator (ASG) is a nonlinear combinator based on three LF SRs, proposed in 1987 by Günther [13] . According to this generator each bit produced by one of the three LF SRs, denoted by S, is used to determine the output from the other two LF SRs A and B. In this work we use a modified and equivalent version of the original ASG defined as follows. If S produces a 1, then the output bit of the generator is the output bit from the LF SR A, which is clocked. Otherwise, if S produces a 0, then the output bit of the generator is the output bit from the LF SR B, which is clocked.
The notation used within this work is as follows. The lengths of the LF SRs S, A and B are denoted respectively by L S , L A and L B . Their characteristic polynomials are respectively P S (x), P A (x) and P B (x), and the sequences they produce are denoted by {s i }, {a i } and {b i }. The output keystream is {z j }.
Despite their simplicity and the large number of published attacks [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , both generators remain remarkably resistant to practical cryptanalysis because there are no known attacks that may be considered efficient enough when the LFSRs are too long for exhaustive search. Each reference above may be described either as a theoretical attack because it requires hard hypothesis or/and the obtained results are probabilistic, or as an attack launched against the hardware implementation of the generator. One of the main advantages of this work is that it proposes a new deterministic approach to the cryptanalysis of LF SR-based stream ciphers.
The edit or Levenshtein distance is the minimum number of elementary operations (insertions, deletions and substitutions) required to transform one sequence X of length N into another sequence Y of length M , where M ≤ N . Some applications of the edit distance are file checking, spell correction, plagiarism detection, molecular biology and speech recognition [19] . The dynamic programming approach (like the shortest-distance graph search and Viterbi algorithm) is a classical solution for computing the edit distance matrix where the distances between prefixes of the sequences are successively evaluated until the final result is achieved. When applying an edit distance attack on a clockcontrolled stream cipher, the objective is to compute the initial state of a target LF SR that is a component of the attacked generator. As in Viterbi search, this problem has the property that the shortest path to a state is always part of any solution of which such a state is part. We will be able to see this fact quite clearly by the formalization of the algorithm as a search through a graph.
Clock-controlled registers are said to work with constrained clocking when a restriction exists on a maximum number of times that the register may be clocked before an output bit is produced. For these registers, attacks based on a so-called constrained edit distance have been proposed and analyzed in [7] and [8] .
In this work, two different possible models for the attacked generator, shown respectively in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , are considered. In both cases it is assumed that the feedback polynomial of the target LF SR is known. According to the first model, it is assumed that Y = {y n } is an intercepted keystream segment of length M , which is seen as a noisy decimated version of a segment X = {x n } of length N produced by a target LF SR. On the other hand, according to the second model, it is assumed that X = {x n } is an intercepted keystream segment of length N , which is seen as a noisy widened version of a segment Y = {y n } of length M produced by a target LF SR. In this latter case, insertions in the sequence Y are indicated by two sequences S and B so that S points the locations where the bits of B must be inserted. The simplest examples represented by these theoretical models are SG and ASG, respectively. Furthermore, in both cases it is not necessary to consider noise to model the generator. The main objective of the attack according to these models will be to deduce some initial state of the target LF SR that allows producing an intercepted keystream sequence through decimation or insertion, respectively, without knowing the decimation or insertion sequences. In either case, the attack is considered successful if only a few initial states are identified.
The use of these models implies that the known plaintext attack is applicable not only to those generators that fit exactly such a model but also to other sequences produced by more complex generators that generalize the given description. In this latter case, the attack would provide a simpler equivalent description of the original attacked generator.
An essential step in edit distance attacks is the computation of edit distance matrices W = (w i,j ), i = 0, 1, . . . , N − M, j = 1, 2, . . . , M associated each one with a couple of sequences X and Y where Y is the intercepted keystream sequence and X is a LF SR sequence produced by one possible initial state.
It is remarkable that the computation of the edit distance matrix requires choosing between both models the one that better fits the attacked generator. If it is the first model, the intercepted sequence is Y while X is the candidate sequence. Otherwise, if it is the second model, then the intercepted sequence is X while Y is the candidate sequence. Also note that from the computation of the edit distance between X and Y , the edit sequences that are computed in the first case correspond to decimation sequences while in the second case they correspond to insertion sequences.
Some of the parameters of such a matrix are described below. Firstly, its dimension is (N −M +1)·M . Furthermore, its last column gives the edit distance between X and Y thanks to the value min i=0,..
Lastly, each element of the matrix but the last column w i,j , i = 0, . . . , N − M, j = 1, . . . , M −1 corresponds exactly to the edit distance between prefix subsequences x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i+j and y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y j . The edit distance between prefix sub-sequences x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i+M and Y are given by
In the edit distance attack here analyzed only deletions and substitutions are allowed. Consequently, each element w i,j of the edit distance matrix W may be recursively computed from the elements of the previous columns according to the formulas in Equation (1), which depend exclusively on the coincidence or difference between the two bits x i+j and y j .
P k (x i+j , y j ) gives the cost of the deletion of k bits previous to x i+j plus its substitution by its complementary if x i+j = y j . Note that a maximum length k of possible runs of decimations is assumed for constrained edit distance matrices. It is also remarkable that at each stage the minimum has to be obtained in order to extend the search at a next stage, which implies the need to maintain a record of the search in the same way that Viterbi algorithm saves a back pointer to the previous state on the maximum probability path.
In order to avoid the computation of the edit distances for all possible initial sequences; in the following we propose a graph-theoretic approach so that the computation of edit distances may be seen as a search through a basic graph.
Such a basic graph is a directed rooted tree where each non-root vertex (i + j, j), i = 0, 1, , N − M ; j = 1, 2, , M , indicates a correspondence between the bits x i+j and y j and each edge indicates either a deletion of the bit x i+j when j = 0, or a possible transition due to a deletion (D) or a substitution (S), in the remaining cases. In this way, the computation of edit distances consists in finding the shortest paths through the graph in Fig. 3 .
Figure 3: Group Detection
For the description of our improvement, we now define a new weighted directed graph, here called induced graph, where the costs of shortest paths come directly from the elements of the matrix W . This induced graph is computed from the basic graph shown in Fig. 3 as follows. If we eliminate vertical edges in the graph of Fig. 3 by computing the partial transitive closure of every pair of edges of the form ((i+j −2, j −1), (i+j −1, j −1)) and ((i+j −1, j −1), (i+j, j)) and substituting them by the edge ((i + j − 2, j − 1), (i + j, j)), we get the graph shown in Fig. 4 , which is here called induced graph. In this graph there are as many vertices as elements in the matrix W , plus an additional source and an additional sink. On the other hand, the directed edges in this induced graph are defined from the computation of the edit distances described in Equation (1), plus additional edges joining the source with the vertices associated to the first column of W and additional edges joining the vertices associated to the last column of W with the sink. For instance, the induced graph corresponding to a constrained edit distance matrix with runs of decimations of maximum length 1 has (N − M + 1) · (2M − N + 2) vertices and 2 · (N − M + 1) · (2M − N + 2) − M − 3 edges. Moreover, edges in the induced graph have different costs depending on the specific pair of sequences X and Y , and particularly on the coincidences between the corresponding bits of both sequences, as described in Equation (1) . Note that in the induced graph, the shortest paths between the source and the sink give us the solution of the cryptanalytic attack through the specification of both decimation and noise sequences that can be extracted from them.
Example : For an intercepted keystream sequence Y :1101011 of length M =7 and a candidate sequence X:1110110111 of length N =10, the constrained edit distance matrix with runs of decimations of maximum length 1 is:
The graph induced by this matrix is shown in Fig. 5 where there are exactly 24 vertices and 38 edges of which the ones belonging to the 18 shortest paths between the source and the sink are remarked in grey. For each one of those 18 optimal paths, we obtain a possible solution to the cryptanalysis. The computation of 18 decimation sequences S may be deduced from the above graphical representation in the following way. A horizontal edge in an optimal path is interpreted as a 0 in a deduced decimation sequence (that is to say, no deletion of the corresponding bit) whereas each oblique edge in the path gives a 1 as decimation bit (corresponding to the deletion of the corresponding bit).
Search of Promising Initial States
The main idea behind the method shown in this Section comes directly from the association between bits x i+j and edges of the induced graph. Since the calculation of the minimum edit distance implies the computation of some shortest path in such a graph, cut sets between the source and the sink in the induced graph may be useful in order to define a set of conditions for candidate sequences so that it is possible to establish a minimum threshold edit distance. In this way, once an intercepted sequence fulfills some of those stated conditions, the cost of the corresponding cut set can be guaranteed to be minimal for some possible candidate sequence, what has direct consequences on the costs of the shortest paths, that is to say, on the edit distances.
In this way, as soon as an intercepted sequence fulfills some specific condition defined below, and this fact allows the description of a candidate and feasible initial sequence, we will know that such an initial sequence will provide us with a useful upper threshold for the edit distance and even in many cases, such a sequence will be a minimum edit distance sequence.
The specific cut sets that we have used for the numerical results shown in this work are defined as follows. Each cut set C i+j , 2 ≤ i + j ≤ N − 1 contains:
1. The set of all the arcs corresponding to the vertex x i+j .
2. All those edges corresponding to bits x w with w > i + j whose output vertex is one of the output vertices of the former set.
For the first model, these cut sets may be characterized by several independent conditions on the intercepted sequence Y that may be used to guarantee a decrease on the edit distances of different candidate sequences X. After having checked each hypothesis separately, the tools used to check both sets of conditions on candidate sequences X are described in terms of a pattern that is made out of independent bits of X according to the formulas in Equation (2).
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N − M + 1;
For the second model, the cut sets may be characterized by different independent conditions on the intercepted sequence X that may be used to guarantee a decrease on the edit distances of candidate sequences Y . After having checked each hypothesis separately, the tools used to check both sets of conditions on candidate sequences Y are described in terms of a pattern that is made out of independent bits of Y according to the formulas in Equation (3).
For checking previous equations (2) and (3), it is necessary to determine the value of N , which depends on k that is the maximum length of possible runs of decimations. For example, if k = 1, then N = 3M/2, which is the mathematical expectation of N in such a case.
Note that the checking procedure of hypothesis described with the previous Equations, applied on the intercepted sequence takes polynomial time as it implies a simple verification of runs. The previous patterns allow discovering promising initial states producing sequences with a low edit distance. In fact, such a pattern provides a good quality threshold for the method that will be described in the following Section.
General Attack
The threshold obtained through the pattern described in the previous Section is a fundamental ingredient of the general attack described below. The algorithm here developed also makes use of a new concept, the so-called stop column, which leads to a considerable saving in the computation of the edit distance matrices. Indeed, a stop column with respect to a threshold T may be defined as a column j 0 of the edit distance matrix W such that each one of their elements fulfills the Equation (4) .
Once a minimum edit distance threshold has been obtained, we may use such a threshold to stop the computation of any matrix W as soon as a stop column has been detected. This is due to the fact that the edit distance corresponding to the candidate initial state will be worse than the threshold. In this simple way, two new improvements on the original attack may be achieved. On the one hand, as yet mentioned, the computation of any matrix may be stopped as soon as a stop column is obtained. On the other hand and thanks to the association between bits x i+j and edges of the graph, we may define a new anti-pattern on the initial states of the target LF SR, the so-called IS-anti-pattern. This pattern is defined from the bits that produce a stop column. It allows us to discard the set of initial states fulfilling such an IS-anti-pattern when an early stop column has been detected. This is so because once a stop column has been obtained, it is possible to discard directly all the initial states whose first bits coincide with those that produce the stop column. In order to take full advantage of stop columns it is convenient to have some efficient way of obtaining a good threshold, which allows us to cut many branches of the search tree. That is exactly the effect of the pattern described in the previous Section.
Since it is possible that the described pattern correspond only to sequences that may not be produced by the target LF SR, in practice it is convenient to restrict the pattern to the length of the target LF SR. So, the pattern obtained from the first formulas of Equations (2) and (3) limited to the length of the target LF SR is what we call IS-pattern. On the other hand, although sequences generated through the IS-pattern have minimum edit distance, it is possible that the corresponding obtained decimation or insertion sequences and noise sequences are not consistent with the description of the attacked generator. This is the reason why the proposed algorithm includes a process of hypothesis relaxation, which implies the successive complementation of bits of the IS-pattern until getting a positive result.
Finally, since the IS-pattern is determined by the runs at the beginning of the intercepted sequence, if no long run exists at the beginning of the sequence, initially the algorithm discards the first bits in the intercepted sequence before a long run, and uses those discarded bits to confirm the result of the attack. This idea is expressed within the algorithm by a parameter H ∈ [0, L], chosen by the attacker depending on its computational capacity (the greater capacity, the fewer H).
The full description of the proposed general edit distance attack is as follows.
Algorithm
Input: The intercepted keystream sequence and the feedback polynomial of the target LF SR of length L.
Output: The initial states of the target LF SR producing sequences with a low edit distance with the intercepted sequence, and the corresponding decimation or insertion sequence and noise sequence.
1. Verification of hypothesis on the intercepted sequence described in Equation (2) or (3).
2. While fewer than H hypothesis are fulfilled, discard the first bit and consider the resulting sequence as new intercepted sequence.
3. Definition of the IS-pattern according to the first L formulas in Equation (2) or (3). 4. Initialization of the threshold T = N .
5. For each initial state fulfilling the IS-pattern, which has not been previously rejected:
(a) Computation of the edit distance matrix, stopping after detecting a stop column according to threshold T and Equation (4).
(b) Definition of the IS-anti-pattern and rejection of all initial states fulfilling it.
(c) Updating of the threshold T .
6. For each initial state producing a sequence with minimum edit distance:
(a) Computation of the shortest paths from the graph induced by the edit distance matrix.
(b) Translation from each shortest path into decimation or insertion sequences and noise sequences.
(c) Checking that the obtained decimation or insertion sequences, and noise sequences are consistent with the attacked generator. Otherwise, updating of the IS-pattern by complementing one of the bits in the original IS-pattern.
Note that if the output is not the minimum edit distance sequence, the obtained edit distance can be used as threshold for the stop column method in order to find such a sequence quickly.
Attack on Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators
In this Section a specific implementation of the general attack presented in the previous Section for the cases of the SG and the ASG is considered.
One of the first questions that have to be taken into account in both cases is the limitation on the number of consecutive deletions because the longest run of consecutive deletions in X to get Y is always shorter than the length L S of the selector register S. This restriction implies that the equation (1) corresponding to the computation of the edit distance matrix should be modified in the following way:
Equations (2) and (3) corresponding to the definition of the pattern in the first and the second model, respectively must be also adapted to the SG and the ASG, producing the Equations (6) and (7) respectively:
If ∀j : 2, 3, . .
Finally, the process of hypothesis relaxation explained in the last Section must also be used for the cases of SG and ASG when the minimum obtained edit distance is greater than N −M since it corresponds to the presence of noise.
The following toy example is used simply to show some of the most remarkable aspects of the proposal.
Example : Given the situation where an attacker has intercepted the keystream sequence Y :1011110 of length M =7 produced by a SG, and knows the following parameters:
• L S = 3 and L A = 7
If we consider H = 3, after the verification of hypothesis from Equation (2) on the intercepted sequence we find that none of them is fulfilled, so we discard the first bit and check the hypothesis on the resulting sequence. In the sequence of length 6 only two hypotheses are fulfilled, so again we discard the first bit and consider the resulting sequence as new intercepted sequence Y :11110 of length M =5 because it fulfills 3 hypothesis.
If we consider N =10, the IS-pattern according to the first formulas in Equation (2) corresponding to the cut sets shown in Fig. 6 for this new sequence X is given by IS-pattern: 111111x For both initial states we get the same minimum edit distance N − M =5. However, when we recover the shortest paths from the source to the sink in the graphs induced by the edit distance matrices, we get the following. On the one hand, in the first case, the shortest paths correspond to non-possible decimation sequences according to the parameters of the attacked generator. On the other hand, the second initial state provides fifty-four shortest paths, and only two of them correspond to possible decimation sequences S: 0011101001 and S:1001110100 that are consistent with P S . However, if we try to confirm these solutions with the first two discarded bits of the intercepted sequence, we get that none of them are consistent with those bits.
Consequently, according to the algorithm, the IS-pattern has to be updated by complementing any of the bits in the original IS-pattern. For instance, consider the new IS-pattern: 111110x. For this new IS-pattern again there exist two initial states fulfilling the IS-pattern for which minimum edit distances equal to 5 are computed. However, only the second initial state 1111101 provides a valid decimation sequence S: 0011101001 that is consistent both with the parameters of the generator and with discarded bits, so this solution is accepted as a valid solution for the cryptanalysis. On the other hand, if we update the IS-pattern by complementing for instance the first bit instead of the last bit, we obtain another new IS-pattern: 011111x, and the resulting initial state and decimation sequence are 0111111 and S:0100111010, respectively.
In conclusion, the attack of this example has been successful alter the evaluation of only 4, out of 128, promising initial states.
Simulation Results
The next table shows some results for experimental sequential implementations of the algorithm against shrunken sequences. The columns denoted Seq.pat. display the number of sequences that fulfill the IS-pattern. Cases marked with * indicate the existence of initial states fulfilling the IS-pattern and producing sequences X that are solutions. Thres. and Dist. are the columns where the obtained threshold and the minimum edit distance are shown.
From these randomly generated examples, we may deduce a general classification of inputs into several cases. The best ones correspond to IS-patterns which directly identify solutions. On the contrary, bad cases are those 'missing the event' cases in which the IS-pattern fails to identify any correct initial state. Such cases are generally associated with long runs at the beginning of the sequences Y . Finally, the medium cases are those for which, despite the non existence of solutions fulfilling the pattern, a good threshold is obtained. Such cases allow a good percentage of saving in computing thanks to the detection of many early stop columns. 9  512  32  57  55  300 200 11  2048  128  166  164  300 200 13  8192  128  115  114  450 300 13  8192  128  176  171  450 300 14 16384  1024  173  171  450 300 16 65536  256  173  171  750 500 14 16384 1024* 291 291 Figure 7 shows a logarithmic plot with a comparison between 2 L A and Seq.pat. obtained from the simulation. According to those data we may estimate that the proposed algorithm produces the solution in O(2 L A /2 ) time instead of the O(2 L A ) time corresponding to the exhaustive search that implied the original attack [20] . These positive results are consequence of early detected stop columns. Furthermore, it is clear that the worst outputs appear when the initial results in steps 1 to 4 are not adequate as there are no initial states fulfilling the IS-pattern. However, we conjecture that even in these cases that require more computation, it is guaranteed that the solution is always obtained. Even though it depends on the obtained pattern, from the number of branches that are cut off we may estimate that the average reduction of states to be explored is 96%. This is reflected in a reduction of more than 25% in the time complexity of the attack.
Note that as aforementioned, the proposed algorithm not always output the minimum edit distance sequence (cases that are here denoted by an *) but however, since the hypothesis on Y are independent, the groups of bits in the IS-pattern are also independent and consequently, the conditions might be considered separately in such way that we might define in this way a relaxed IS-pattern which might lead to sequences that fulfill them. In addition, we may identify some characteristics of patterns and cases where the improvement is Figure 7 : Logarithmic plot of simulation results more dramatic. In particular, empirical results have shown that intercepted sequences Y with short runs at the beginning cause a greater improvement in the time complexity of the attack. Thus, another way to avoid a bad behaviour of the original algorithm is by choosing sub-sequences from the intercepted sequence Y that have no too long runs at the beginning, and by applying the algorithm to each one of these sub-sequences.
Conclusions
In this work a new deterministic approach to the cryptanalysis of LF SR-based stream ciphers has been proposed. In particular, a practical improvement on the edit distance attack on certain clock-controlled LF SR-based generators has been proposed, which reduces the computational complexity of the original attack because it does not require an exhaustive search over all the initial states of the target LF SR.
The main tool used for the optimization of the original attack was the definition of graphs where optimal paths provide cryptanalytic results and of cut sets on them that have been used to obtain a useful threshold to cut the search tree.
An extension of this article, which is being part of a work in progress, takes advantage of the basic idea of using cut sets to improve edit distance attacks against generalized clock-controlled LF SR-based generators. In order to do this, the three edit operations are considered and the resulting cut sets on the corresponding induced graph allow the identification of promising initial states.
